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Abstract
In this paper we present a rigorously motivated pricing equation for derivatives,
including cash collateralization schemes, which is consistent with quoted market bond
prices. Traditionally, there have been differences in how instruments with similar
cash flow structures have been priced if their definition falls under that of a financial
derivative versus if they correspond to bonds, leading to possibilities such as funding
through derivatives transactions. Furthermore, the problem has not been solved with
the recent introduction of Funding Valuation Adjustments in derivatives pricing, and
in some cases has even been made worse.
In contrast, our proposed equation is not only consistent with fixed income assets
and liabilities, but is also symmetric, implying a well-defined exit price, independent
of the entity performing the valuation. Also, we provide some practical proxies, such
as first-order approximations or basing calculations of CVA and DVA on bond curves,
rather than Credit Default Swaps.
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1 Introduction and Final Pricing Formula
Ever since Black, Scholes and Merton’s seminal works [1, 2], and until recently, financial
derivatives products have been priced without taking into consideration credit- or funding
spreads of either counterparty in the transaction. A frequently stated reason for this
approach (eg, [3]) was that financial institutions could, in the pre-financial crisis world,
borrow funds at the prevailing Libor rate, and any funding considerations could therefore
be taken into account by discounting cash flows accordingly.
This did, however, not correctly reflect the counterparty credit risk inherent in any
given derivative. A digital option which is far in the money behaves similarly to a zero-
coupon bond, yet traditionally its cash flows were discounted at Libor, or a similar rate,
instead of applying the corresponding bond curve. The inconsistency in the way these
two, functionally similar, deals were treated led some market participants to securing
funding through derivatives transactions. Derivatives desks are of course aware of cur-
rent bond prices, and it is therefore expected that they should charge the counterparties
accordingly, reflecting the value of the liquidity provided to the counterparty. But the
accounting mismatch still provided incentives for closing deals entailing funding, thus ren-
dering an upfront profit for the dealer, while at the same time reducing funding costs for
the counterparty. It is true that, from the risk management side, some sophisticated banks
were provisioning expected counterparty credit losses based on market-implied estimates.
However, many were basing such provisions on historical data.
A step in the direction of reconciling bond- and derivative valuations was taken with
the entry into force of the accounting standard IFRS 13. This standard defines fair value
as an exit price, further stressing the use of market-implied (or at least market-adjusted)
valuations, and including a bank’s own non-performance risk, ie, the possibility that the
bank may not fulfill all of its obligations. The fair value should not be entity-specific,
in the sense that other market participants should arrive at the same valuation. The
standard interpretation of IFRS 13 is to include in the derivative price a Credit Valua-
tion Adjustment (CVA), representing the market value of the deal’s counterparty credit
risk1, together with a Debit Valuation Adjustment (DVA), representing the bank’s non-
performance risk and based on its credit spread. The fair value obtained in this way is
symmetric, in the sense that two counterparties will arrive at the same value if they use
the same calculation methodology and market inputs. For a technical account of these
subjects see [4, 5], or the textbooks [6, 7, 8].
After including CVA and DVA, deals with risky counterparties that once seemed ar-
tificially appealing will not produce as large an accounting profit upfront, thus reflecting
the true nature of these transactions. The most frequent way to quantify CVA and DVA
is to estimate market-implied default probabilities using Credit Default Swaps (CDS), in-
1The market value of a given risk can be defined as the cost of buying protection against it in the market,
ie, the cost of hedging it. It is true that CVA is often expressed as the expected value of discounted losses
due to counterparty defaults, but it should be born in mind that these expectations are based on market
inputs, and not on historical (or real-world) losses due to counterparty defaults.
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struments in which an insurance premium, the CDS spread, is exchanged for protection
against losses stemming from a given bond issuer’s default. With equal recovery rates, a
higher CDS spread entails a greater probability of default. Credit risk is not the entire
story however. A persistent property of bond markets is the existence of a difference be-
tween the excess rates of return of bonds over the risk-free rate2 plus the CDS spread.
Nevertheless, a bond and a CDS on the same reference basically refer to the same type of
risk, so in a frictionless market, arguments of arbitrage should end up driving such differ-
ence, called the bond-CDS basis, to zero. There are a number of reasons that explain why
this gap fails to disappear completely, besides the classical argument of capital constraints
preventing arbitrage opportunities (see [9]). Certain frictions, like the Cheapest-to-deliver
option embedded in CDS contracts ([10, 11]) or haircuts that the arbitrageur encounters
when financing bond purchases in the repo market ([12]), explain the rationale behind the
basis. For further details on the origin of the basis see, for example, [13]. For simplicity,
the many reasons underlying the basis are commonly referred to as liquidity risk.
In the past couple of years, an additional step has been taken by some sophisticated
banks, with the inclusion of a Funding Valuation Adjustment3 (FVA). The aim of such an
adjustment is to take into consideration the funding costs associated to the ”production” of
a derivative’s transaction, ie, the cost of funding the hedging of its risks during the lifetime
of the deal. This introduces the bank’s complete bond spread into the derivatives price.
However, rather than solving the discrepancy between bond- and derivatives prices, many
approaches to FVA actually make it larger. Consider, for example, the in-the-money digital
option mentioned above, and suppose that the bank has bought the option, analogously to
a bond purchase. Any approach to pricing it consistently with bonds should thus contain
a CVA, reflecting the counterparty’s credit risk, together with an additional term governed
by the counterparty’s bond-CDS basis to reflect the bond’s liquidity premium. In contrast,
one approach to FVA adds the bank’s complete funding cost (proportional to its funding
spread) to the calculated CVA. The counterparty’s bond-CDS basis is therefore not part
of the price and furthermore, as we will explain later, its CVA contributes implicitly to
the bank’s funding spread, and is therefore double counted. Needless to say, the obtained
valuation will not be symmetric, and the counterparty will calculate a different derivatives
price. In Section 2 we will explain the limitations of current FVA frameworks in more
detail.
In this paper we provide a solution in the form of a rigorously motivated derivative
pricing equation that is completely consistent with market bond prices. We will be con-
cerned here with uncollateralized derivatives, since the direct exposure that they generate
to the counterparty is analogous to bond exposure, although we will briefly comment on
the partially collateralized case in Section 4. At a given time t, the pricing equation takes
2It is, of course, doubtful that any truly risk-free interest rate can be said to exist, but for practical (and
theoretical, as will be discussed below) purposes an Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rate is often employed
(see [3]). It has become a standard to pay such rates for held collateral, and they are therefore often
referred to as collateral rates.
3See, for example, the aforementioned textbooks or [14, 15, 16].
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the form
Vt = V
c
t − CV At +DV At +BFV At , (1)
where Vt is the fair value at t, and its components are
• V ct : the fair value that would be obtained at t if the derivative were perfectly col-
lateralized, meaning that collateral is posted in a continuous fashion by the bank or
counterparty in response to changes in the derivative valuation. In [17] it was shown
that in such idealized cases the derivative value is simply obtained by discounting
all future cash flows using the rate paid on the collateral accounts.
• CV At: The CVA calculated to adjust for the counterparty’s credit risk.
• DV At: The DVA reflecting own credit risk, and which equals the CVA that would
be calculated by the counterparty.
• BFV At: The new term in our approach, which we call a Bilateral Funding
Valuation Adjustment, and that incorporates the effects of both the bank’s and
counterparty’s bond-CDS bases. In turn, we separate it as
BFV At = −CFV At +DFV At , (2)
where CFV At stands for Credit Funding Valuation Adjustment, and is gov-
erned by the counterparty’s bond-CDS basis, whileDFV At means Debit Funding
Valuation Adjustment, and depends on the bank’s bond-CDS basis. They can
be thought of as correcting CVA and DVA, respectively, extending them to a full
funding adjustment. In particular, positive exposure to the counterparty, given by
V +t ≡ max(Vt, 0), (3)
and which arises when the derivative can be considered an asset, generates CFV At,
while negative exposure (the derivative is a liability)
V −t ≡ max(−Vt, 0) (4)
gives rise to a DFV At. In more detail,
CFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1alive(s)D(t, s) γ
C
s V
+
s ds
]
, (5)
where E[·] stands for ”Expected Value4”, t is the current valuation time, T is ma-
turity of the deal, s is an integration variable representing all intermediate times
between the present (t) and maturity (T ), 1alive(s) means that the deal should be
alive at s (it is a variable that is equal to 1 if the deal is alive at s, and zero otherwise),
D(t, s) is the discount factor between t and s, γCs is the counterparty’s bond-CDS
basis at s, and V +s is the aforementioned positive exposure. In the same way,
DFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1alive(s)D(t, s) γ
B
s V
−
s ds
]
, (6)
where γBs is the bank’s bond-CDS basis.
4Under the risk-neutral, or market-implied, measure.
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It should be noted that the pricing equation (1) is symmetric, and as a consequence
price agreement between two counterparties using it will always be possible. The proposal
is therefore especially suitable in an accounting framework, since price agreement implies
that it should always be possible to exit the deal at that price5.
In the case that the derivative is partially collateralized, the resulting expressions
remain relatively simple, assuming cash-collateralization. If we name C(t) the amount of
collateral held by the bank at time t (which is defined as negative if the bank has posted
net collateral), we get
CFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1alive(s)D(t, s) γ
C
s (Vs − C(s))+ ds
]
, (7)
and
DFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1alive(s)D(t, s) γ
B
s (Vs − C(s))− ds
]
. (8)
In the next section we will bring into focus the limitations of current approaches to
derivative pricing and FVA. We will then detail and motivate our proposal for a derivative
fair value in Section 3 and discuss briefly the (partially) collateralized case in Section
4. We finish with conclusions and a final discussion in Section 5. In the appendices,
a mathematically rigorous derivation of the pricing formula is provided in Appendix A,
while an analytical expression for bond prices, allowing a calibration to market prices, can
be found in C.
2 The Bond-Derivative Divide
Before continuing in Section 3 with our proposal, we will now highlight some of the current
approaches to derivative pricing and FVA, and in particular focus on the discrepancy
between bond- and derivative valuations. This section is independent of the rest of the
paper, but should shed some light on the validity of the pricing equation (1).
The alternative approaches that we will discuss are FV A = 0, own bond-CDS based
FVA, transfer cost-based FVA, CVA and full FVA with no DVA, asymmetric FVA with
only a funding cost, and CVA calculated using bond curves. In many cases, the inclusion
of FVA will make the discrepancy with bond prices worse, entailing for example double
counting of Credit- and Funding Valuation Adjustments.
5Recently, a similar result has been obtained in [18], starting from rather different assumptions. In
this paper, the author posits that counterparties, rather than remaining in an uncollateralized setup, have
economic incentives to willingly enter into collateral agreements in which the rate paid on received collateral
is their funding rate. The different rate paid on collateral then leads to funding adjustments similar to our
(5) and (6).
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2.1 Should FVA be zero?
In [19] the controversial claim was made that derivative pricing should include CVA and
DVA, but not FVA. In [20] and [21] the same authors admit that it is only defensible to
base an FVA on the bank’s bond-CDS basis, but they also argue that it does not seem
compatible with IFRS 13 to include such an FVA in the accounting fair-value, since it
would consist of an entity-specific valuation. Arguably, different counterparties will arrive
at different prices.
Others have recognized that it seems to make economic sense to calculate even a
substantial FVA, reflecting the costs of funding the derivative’s hedges, and take it into
consideration in decision-making processes, but that it should not be used for accounting
purposes [22]. The reason given is that the market price is not fixed by a given entity’s
funding costs, in the same way that the market price of a given commodity is not a
direct function of a given producer’s extraction costs. Yet another interpretation of this
observation is that a ”market” FVA should be calculated, based on the average funding
costs of different market actors.
However, it is not correct that IFRS 13 implies that valuations cannot be based on
parameters depending on the own entity, as the inclusion of DVA exemplifies. Instead, the
parameters should be such that agents other than the entity will arrive at the same values.
In other words, they should be based on objective, market-based information. Consistency
with bond prices requires the introduction of an FVA, but as long as it is calculated using
market information, there is no problem in including it in an accounting fair value.
In [23, 24] a zero FVA is also obtained under the assumption that the bank can freely
trade in own bonds of different seniority. In fact, the methodology that we use in this
paper, that of replication, follows the same principles as that of these papers. The result
of this pricing methodology depends on the risk factors on which the product value is
assumed to depend, and if a dependence on the full funding spread is required, as it must
if consistency with bond prices is required, the bond-CDS basis will emerge from the
replication.
2.2 Incorporating own bond-CDS basis
In the previous case we mentioned that [20] and [21] allowed for an FVA depending on
the bank’s bond-CDS basis, although the authors expressed doubts whether such an FVA
is compatible with accounting standards. Such a dependence was first proposed in [14],
and in [25] we arrived at a similar result by different means, although we do not believe
that the accounting mismatch is irreconcilable. The only problem with these approaches,
in our view, is that they do not incorporate the counterparty’s funding spread, and can
therefore not reproduce the market prices for the counterparty’s bonds.
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2.3 Transfer cost-based FVA
From the perspective of managing a derivative desk it seems appealing to base FVA on
the bank’s internal funds transfer rates, since they determine the actual financing costs
experienced by the desk. In Proposition 3 of the report [26], it is stated that it is desirable
to have a close alignment between FVA calculations and funds transfer pricing rules,
in order to avoid arbitrage opportunities for external liquidity takers. A client should
not be able to benefit from entering an in-the-money derivative as compared to taking a
traditional loan, it is argued.
From the accounting perspective it makes less sense to base FVA on funds transfer
rates. Clearly, doing so would constitute an entity-specific calculation, and not be directly
market based. And the problem goes deeper as banks that can freely alter their transfer
rates could directly manipulate their obtained accounting FVA. It should instead be the
transfer costs that should adapt to the external conditions, with FVA calculated indepen-
dently. Finally, if the goal is to avoid arbitrage opportunities for external liquidity takers
it becomes even more relevant to impose consistency between funding through derivatives
and bonds.
2.4 Unilateral CVA and full FVA with no DVA
As summarized in Proposition 8 of the report [26], DVA is difficult to monetize, impossible
to completely hedge, and from the point of view of the derivatives desk leads to a negative
carry ie, a loss of value with the passage of time. This has led to proposals excluding
DVA from pricing, and instead including a full FVA, that is, an FVA based on the bank’s
full funding spread. In Section 14.3.6 of [6], a first-order approach in this spirit is pre-
sented, denoted as CVA+FCA+FBA. Furthermore, in [27] such a price was obtained via
replication, including higher order corrections, by not considering the bank’s default as a
risk-factor.
In the case of liabilities this approach will yield a numerically similar result as our
proposal (1), since an FVA based on the complete funding spread is at first order equal
to DVA plus an FVA based on the bond-CDS basis, but there will be large differences for
assets. The reason for this is that in the CVA + full FVA setup there is an important
double counting of CVA. Following the example given in Proposition 6 of [26], if the bank
were to deal with a single counterparty, the bank’s riskiness, and therefore its funding
spread, should be entirely determined by the riskiness of the counterparty. Implicit in
the bank’s funding spread is therefore the counterparty’s CVA and adding the two will
produce a full double counting. Proponents of this approach argue that both the CVA
hedge and the liquidity provided to the counterparty must be financed independently.
However, if the bank were to hedge its exposure to the counterparty, what is left is a
purely riskless instrument, and the bank’s funding spread should adjust accordingly, since
what remains will be a riskless balance sheet. In other words, hedging CVA does not have
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to be considered a cost, but can instead be thought of as an investment in risk reduction,
accompanied by the associated funding benefit.
It is true that funding costs will not adapt instantly to variations in risk profiles.
However, as discussed in [25], large portions of the bank’s derivatives portfolio are con-
tinuously renewing, with similar deals replacing maturing ones. For such a steady state
balance sheet, the funding spread should have adapted to the riskiness of the portfolio.
In the case of an expanding or contracting business the situation is more complex, but
there will in general still be a significant overlap between the portfolio compositions in,
for example, consecutive months, implying that funding costs should reflect the assumed
risks.
The use of CVA + full FVA means that credit given to the counterparty through
derivatives transactions will be charged a rate greater than the market rate. Of course,
an institution should always try to maximize profits, and if a counterparty is prepared
to accept such a price the bank should agree, but we would argue that such a scenario
should lead to an upfront accounting gain. The risk of using CVA + full FVA is instead
that deals that are actually profitable may not appear as such, leading to lost business
opportunities. Furthermore, the negative carry of DVA is actually not real6 since DVA
can be identified with a funding benefit. If this benefit is compensated for internally, the
negative carry will go away.
2.5 Asymmetric FVA with no funding benefit
Yet another possibility, presented in Section 14.3.6 of [6], is to calculate a CVA + DVA
+ FCA, where FCA (the funding cost) is the part of a full FVA that is based on positive
exposures. This has the advantage, from the management point of view, that FCA, being
based on the bank’s complete funding spread, constitutes a natural hedge for the DVA
term. However, numerically the approach is similar to CVA + full FVA, and therefore has
the same problems. There will be a mismatch between credit provided to the counterparty
through derivatives versus by other means.
2.6 Calculating CVA and DVA from bond curves
In this section we have taken a critical position regarding common FVA frameworks, but
let us end it on a positive note. Some financial entities have reported calculating a DVA
term based upon the default probabilities extracted from their own issued bonds. By
doing so, they argue, they do not need to calculate any FVA term, since such a DVA also
encompasses their funding capabilities. Ordinarily, CVA and DVA depend on the credit
component of the counterparty’s and bank’s respective funding spreads, and the question
is therefore whether one can incorporate funding considerations by extending them to the
6This is at least the case for a steady state balance sheet.
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full funding spreads. In other words, we would infer the default probabilities underlying
these adjustments from bonds rather than CDSs.
In fact, such an approach is not unreasonable, and if it is applied to both CVA and
DVA, as we show in Appendix B, it can be obtained as an approximation to the exact
pricing equation obtained in the next section. Furthermore, its non-recursive form makes
it much simpler to implement, making it a practical proxy for the full calculation.
3 Reconciling the two worlds: Replicating Derivatives with
Bonds
In this section we will motivate our proposal. For a more rigorous derivation see Appendix
A. We will start with the so-called perfectly collateralized case in Section 3.1, for which
there is neither CVA, DVA nor FVA, and we will then explain how the general case arises
by modeling the financing of the absence of collateral in terms of bonds.
3.1 A perfectly collateralized point of departure
The point of departure for the general case will be a perfectly collateralized trade, a
theoretical construct in which there is a continuous exchange of cash collateral so that
at all times neither counterparty has any net exposure to the other. This implies that
there will be no losses due to defaults, and therefore no CVA or DVA. What is perhaps
less obvious is that there will not be any funding adjustments either. The reason is that
it is assumed that the trade can be hedged in the interbank market using (different)
collateralized trades. The initial cost of setting up hedges and residual balances in cash
accounts should coincide with the premium paid by the counterparty. Furthermore, any
variation of the MtM of the original deal implying, for example, that the bank must post
additional collateral to the counterparty will be offset by collateral posted to the bank by
the counterparties of the hedges.
As shown in [17], the value of such a perfectly collateralized derivative is obtained by
discounting all future cash flows by the rate paid on the held collateral, which in typical
collateral agreements is taken to be an OIS rate c based on overnight interbank lending.
To understand why this discount rate should be used, consider a deal in which the bank
receives a single fixed cash flow N . An instant before maturity, the deal value will be equal
to N , since any discount can be ignored, and the cash held in collateral accounts will also
equal N . At maturity, the deal is closed, but there is no net exchange of cash between
the bank and the counterparty since the final cash flow N will cancel the return of the
collateral. Now, at previous times, the bank must pay the OIS rate c on the collateral
account balance, but since there will be no net cash exchange at maturity it will only
agree to paying this rate if at the same time the collateral balance increases by the same
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amount, compensating this outflow (so that there are no net cash interchanges at previous
times either).
The end result is that the amount of collateral, and therefore the value of the deal,
grows at the rate c. In other words, previous values of the deal are obtained by discounting
using precisely c. If we denote the deal value at time t by V ct , maturity by T , and taking
into account the continuous accruing of the collateral account, we therefore have
V ct = exp
−(T−t)·c N .
Allowing for the possibility that c may vary in time (although in a way known beforehand)
as ct, this becomes
7
V ct = exp
− ∫ Tt csds N .
Of course, in reality the values of cs at times later than t are not known at t, so we
need to take expectations over the different paths that the collateral rate can take8:
V ct = E
[
exp−
∫ T
t csds
]
N .
Following, for example, [28], we introduce the stochastic discount factor
D(t, t′) ≡ exp
(
−
∫ t′
t
csds
)
. (9)
In general, since we are dealing with derivatives, we should expect the final cash flow
to be an unknown payoff, following some statistical distribution, possibly correlated with
the discount factor. This payoff, occurring at maturity, can be written simply as V cT , and
we therefore have
V ct = E
[
D(t, t′)V cT
]
. (10)
3.2 Financing the collateral gap
Let us now turn to the case of main interest, in which the derivative is uncollateralized,
leaving a discussion of the partially collateralized case for Section 4.
7Let t1 = t, t2, . . . , tn = T be times between which the collateral rate c is fixed, and which define
the periods ∆ti ≡ ti+1 − ti upon which the collateral account interest rate payments are based (typically
daily periods). Ignoring subtleties regarding day-count conventions, the collateral account will then grow
between ti and ti+1 by a factor (1+cti ·∆ti). Using that ∆ti is small for frequent collateral margining, this
factor can be substituted for exp (cti ·∆ti), since the former expression is the first order approximation
of the latter. Multiplying the factors stemming from all periods gives V cT =
∏n−1
i exp (cti ·∆ti)V ct =
exp
(∑n−1
i cti ·∆ti
)
V ct . Substituting the sum inside the exponential for an integral (exact in the limit
when ∆ti → 0) gives the result.
8The exact measure needed to take this expectation is obtained from a more careful analysis, see [17],
or Appendix A.
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If the deal is not collateralized there will be two consequences: Firstly, there will be
losses upon defaults of either the bank or counterparty, depending on the sign of the value
of the trade at that moment. Secondly, the lack of posted collateral has to be financed
to compensate for the collateral movements of any market hedges, and also the funding
implicit in the trades net value. Funding the trades NPV, applying the bank’s funding
curve, transfer costs, etc, is what has led to previous proposals on FVA. Our main point
is that we recognize that in the case of positive exposure to the counterparty, we are
financing the counterparty for the amount that would have been transferred as collateral
in the perfectly collateralized case. The corresponding funding adjustment thus depends
on the accounting value of financing the counterparty, and not the cost of obtaining bank
funds.
Any derivatives trade can be thought of as composed of its perfectly collateralized
counterpart together with a financing of any deficit or excess of collateral. If the exposure is
positive V +t > 0, the counterparty would have transferred posted collateral corresponding
to this exposure in the perfectly collateralized case. In allowing it not to do so, the bank
is implicitly lending the counterparty funds, or equivalently, buying the counterparty’s
bonds, whose value we will write as BCi (t), with the label ’i’ specifying the individual
bonds. Let ωCi be the quantity held of bond ’i’. The total value of these bonds will be
precisely V +t , so we have the Credit Constraint∑
i
ωCi B
C
i (t) = V
+
t , (11)
which holds at all times. The bank can hedge this bond component of the derivative by
taking a short position in the counterparty’s bonds.
But why is more than one bond needed in (11)? Could we not simply include a
single bond with the same maturity as the derivative? No, unfortunately, the uncertain
and possibly bilateral nature of derivative cash flows complicates matters. Consider, for
instance, an interest rate swap with a value of 0 at inception, implying a vanishing positive
exposure. Does this, together with (11), mean that the bond-component of the derivative
is zero as well? Clearly, this cannot be the case, because there is a positive probability
that the derivative value in the future will move in favor of the bank, generating a non-
zero positive exposure and thereby producing a position in the counterparty’s bonds.
The possibility of this forward position must be included in the initial valuation, and if
the counterparty’s bond yield rises, the fair value, from the point of view of the bank,
should decrease9. Consider, for example, the case of two bonds, and V +t = 0. The credit
constraint then becomes
ωC1 B
C
1 (t) + ω
C
2 B
C
2 (t) = 0 .
If the duration of, for instance, the second bond is greater than the first and ωC2 > 0
(requiring that ωC1 < 0), the total value of the bonds will decrease upon parallel increases
9Since no additional cash flows are interchanged as a consequence of the change in bond yield, the bank
will be lending funds to the counterparty at a rate cheaper than the new market rate, entailing a loss in
value.
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of the yield curve. The exact amount of bonds would then be determined by requiring a
matching of the bond and derivative sensitivities to the yield curve. Due to the constraint,
in order to capture n points of the yield curve, at least n+ 1 bonds must be included.
However, in order to correctly represent the dependence of the derivative on the coun-
terparty’s credit risk, besides matching derivative- and bond curve sensitivities, the jump-
to-default components ie, the change in value as a consequence of the counterparty’s default
event, must be captured as well. One way to achieve this would be to include additional
bonds in (11) (in, for example [24] the jump-to-default component was replicated using
bonds of different seniority), and simultaneously choose the quantities ωCi so that both
bond curve and jump-to-default dependencies take the correct values. Another possibility
is to include Credit Default Swaps in the mix, as we do in our derivation in Appendix
A, greatly simplifying the calculation. Assuming that such CDS can be entered without
a relevant upfront payment, they can be added without changing the amount of credit
given to the counterparty, and therefore without affecting (11). The choice of whether to
replicate the jump-to-default component using additional bonds or CDS should not alter
the obtained result.
We repeat the steps outlined above for negative exposure, V −t > 0. In this case, the
bank has transferred less collateral to the counterparty, as compared with the perfectly
collateralized case. In analogy with the positive exposure case, the counterparty is financ-
ing the bank, and it is therefore as if the bank had issued bonds BBi (t), of total value
−V −t (the value is negative for the bank since they are a liability), which were bought by
the counterparty. We therefore have the Debit Constraint∑
i
ωBi B
B
i (t) = −V −t . (12)
This component can of course be hedged by trading in the entity’s bonds.
The issue of the bank’s jump-to-default is more contentious. The reason is that it
is difficult for a bank to replicate its own jump-to-default using real instruments10, and
hedging it can prove to be pernicious (see for example [29]). As a case in point, consider
that no bank can sell its own CDS (who would buy protection from a seller on the seller’s
own default?). However, in [25] it was explained that, even in a hedging context, it makes
sense to model the existing unhedged jump-to-default component using a fictitious position
on a CDS written on the bank, which would11 be prepared to pay or receive precisely the
market spread for such a CDS, even though it could not enter into it in practice. The reason
is that cash-flows occurring at default will affect the bank’s recovery, which should alter its
funding costs. The additional funding costs or benefits obtained in this way compensate
for the CDS premium. Furthermore, from an accounting perspective it is important to
fully include own credit spreads, since they should be taken into account in any exit price.
10For example, in [24] the jump-to-default component is replicated using two bonds of different seniority.
However, the authors recognize that there might be a mismatch between the post-default value of the bond
portfolio and the derivative due to a lack of control over bond recoveries.
11At least in the case of a steady state balance sheet, in which new deals replace other deals on a
continuous basis.
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The final result is that the bank’s own credit risk can be treated symmetrically in the
same way as for the counterparty.
In sum, any derivatives deal can be decomposed as
Derivative = Perfectly Collateralized Derivative + Bonds + (optionally) CDS . (13)
The way to proceed is to calculate the amount of bonds and CDS, at current and future
times, implied by this decomposition, and derive a pricing equation, as is done in the
appendix. Here, we will give a heuristic motivation of the result.
Firstly, any cash flows occurring at default of either party are precisely those underly-
ing calculations of CVA and DVA. By calculating CVA and DVA we are therefore taking
into consideration the deal’s credit risk. CVA is contingent, meaning that it is based on
counterparty defaults taking place prior to any default by the bank itself. The same hap-
pens with DVA. The rationale behind this contingency is that the derivative is liquidated
upon the first default, by either counterparty, and so its value will not be affected by
defaults beyond the first. The expressions for CVA and DVA are therefore
CV At = E
[
1{τC<τB}D(t, τ
C)
(
1−RC(τC)) (V cτC)+] (14)
and
DV At = E
[
1{τB<τC}D(t, τ
B)
(
1−RB(τB)) (V cτB)−] , (15)
where τC and τB are times at which the defaults occur for the counterparty and bank,
respectively, RC(t) and RB(t) are their recovery fractions, V ct is the value of the perfectly
collateralized equivalent of the derivative12, D(t, ·) is the stochastic discount factor (9),
and 1··· is an indicator function requiring the stated condition to be satisfied. Basically,
we are taking the expected value of all future losses due to defaults, given by the perfectly
collateralized equivalent exposures at the time of default discounted to the present time.
The indicators imply that only losses corresponding to the first default will contribute,
reflecting the contingency. Usually, we will assume constant recoveries, and so RC(t) ≡ RC
and RB(t) ≡ RB.
These terms include the credit risk of the bonds satisfying (11) and (12), so the only
additional contribution to the derivative value should depend on the fraction of the bond
yield not explained by credit risk. If we decompose a bond yield fXt , where X is either
equal to C, for the counterparty, or B for the bank, as
fXt = ct + pi
X
t + γ
X
t ,
12We adopt the riskless close-out convention, leading to perfectly collateralized exposures being used in
the expressions for CVA and DVA. An important point, though, is that the value of future defaults may be
incorporated into the close-out claim, put forth upon default, if a so-called risky close-out is performed (see
[30, 31]). However, for unsophisticated counterparties, such as the ones that tend to not have collateral
agreements with the bank, we would expect a riskless closeout, in which the claim is based on the riskless
value, since such counterparties are not likely to have the ability to calculate CVA and DVA. On the other
hand, for sophisticated counterparties it is frequent to have a collateral agreement with daily margin, based
on the perfectly collateralized value, so it is natural that a close-out should also be based upon this value.
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where ct is the OIS rate (often considered as a proxy for a ”risk-free” rate), pi
X
t is the
CDS spread, encoding credit risk, and γXt the bond-CDS basis (by definition), we are
thus saying that the remaining terms contributing to the derivative valuation should be
governed by the bond-CDS basis.
In effect, on the credit side we are charging the counterparty for the additional liquidity
premium implicit in the funds provided to the counterparty due to the lack of (expected)
posted collateral. We will call this term a Credit Funding Valuation Adjustment
(CFVA), and not a Funding Cost Adjustment, a common term in the FVA literature,
since it should not be confused with the bank’s own funding costs. The properties that
we expect that this CFVA should have are:
• Contributions to the adjustment from any future time s ≥ t should be proportional
to γCs · V +s , since by (11) the net amount of bonds held are V +s , and the liquidity
premium charged for these bonds is γCs .
• Only future scenarios in which the deal is alive should contribute. If either counter-
party has defaulted previously, the deal will have been liquidated, and no funding
adjustment should be made. This condition can be incorporated by the indicators
1{τC>s}1{τB>s}.
• Future contributions to the adjustment should be discounted to the present time
using the stochastic discount factor D(t, s).
• We should sum over the contributions to CFV At from all future times s, implying
an integration over the lifetime of the deal.
• Since the previous discussed factors are stochastic, in general, we should take the
expectation of their product (in the appropriate measure) in order to obtain the final
adjustment.
In total this gives
CFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s) γ
C
s V
+
s ds
]
, (16)
and the fair value will be reduced by this amount.
In the same way, we obtain for the debit side the Debit Funding Valuation Ad-
justment (DFVA), given by
DFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s) γ
B
s V
−
s ds
]
, (17)
which enters with a positive sign in the fair value.
A nice property of (16) and (17) is that they are symmetric: the CFVA calculated by
the bank coincides with the DFVA calculated by the counterparty, and vice versa. This
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prompts us to define a Bilateral Funding Valuation Adjustment BFVA, as
BFV At = −CFV At +DFV At , (18)
analogously to the Bilateral Credit Valuation Adjustment (introduced in [5]).
Adding up the different contributions, our complete proposal for the fair value Vt of
the derivatives transaction is thus
Vt = V
c
t − CV At +DV At +BFV At , (19)
with BFV At defined by equations (16)-(18). It should be noted that (19) is recursive,
since Vt will depend, through the funding adjustment BFV At, on V
+
s and V
−
s at later
times. This makes the equation difficult and costly to implement for the entire derivatives
portfolio, but as we show in Appendix B, and have discussed in Section 2.6, reasonable
and practical approximation are obtained by either omitting the recursive behaviour of
the FV A terms, or by dropping the BFV At term altogether and instead incorporating
funding considerations into CV At and DV At by basing them on bond-implied default
probabilities.
We have constructed the pricing equation (19) taking into consideration bond-CDS
bases in order to be consistent with both the counterparty’s and the bank’s bonds. But
can we actually reproduce observed bond prices in the current framework? Yes, but
there are some subtleties when applying so-called recovery conventions. In Appendix C
we attempt to shed light on this issue, deriving closed expressions for bond prices under
different conventions. The resulting formulae can be used to calibrate the bond-CDS bases
to bond market prices.
4 Partially Collateralized Derivatives
Even though we will not give a rigorous motivation here, we will dedicate a few lines
to explain how the pricing equation can be extended to include partially collateralized
derivatives, meaning derivatives subject to a Credit Support Annex (CSA), but cannot be
considered perfectly collateralized (for which the value is simply V ct ). Depending on the
degree of accuracy required, this may encompass practically all deals, since in reality it is
not possible to obtain the ideal of perfect collateralization. We will limit ourselves to cash
collateral, noting that non-standard collateral, such as bonds denominated in domestic
or foreign currencies, commodities, equities, etc, can be incorporated at the expense of
considerable complexity in the pricing (affecting the relevant pricing measures, etc). For
an example of the treatment of collateralization in a funding framework, see [15, 16].
Two ways in which counterparty exposure can arise when cash collateralization is not
perfect are
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1. The existence of thresholds, minimum-transfer-amounts, independent amounts and
non-continuous remargining will imply that, at any given moment t, the amount of
held collateral C(t) is not exactly equal to the derivatives value Vt.
2. At default of either party, there is typically a period of uncertainty ∆, a so-called
cure period (or margin period of risk), in which no further collateral is posted by
the defaulting party, but it is not yet legally clear that the default has actually
taken place and/or the surviving party has not yet closed out all of the market
hedges corresponding to the derivatives trade in question. This incremental lack
of collateral at default implies an additional exposure to the defaulting party, and
thereby a potentially greater loss.
In order to incorporate partial collateralization the first thing that must be done is
to model the collateral function C(t). In general, it can be a rather complex function
dependent on the path taken by the derivatives price up to t. In many circumstances it
is sufficient, however, to use an approximate form. For example, if the collateralization is
considered perfect, with the exception of the existence of a bilateral threshold H, we have
C(t) = sign(V ct ) max (|V ct | −H, 0) ,
where the amount of collateral depends on the perfectly collateralized value, as is common
in collateral agreements. Another special case, which we have already seen, is of course
the uncollateralized case in which C(t) = 0. Further examples can be obtained in [32] or
[33].
Introducing collateral in the framework is then straightforward. To begin with, it is
well-known how to incorporate held collateral into CVA and DVA calculations. For CVA,
we have:
CV At = E
[
1{τC<τB}D(t, τ
C)
(
1−RC(τC)) (V cτC − C(τC))+] (20)
and analogously for DVA. This formula is based on a reduced exposure to the counterparty
at the time of default by C(τ).
Now, any amount of held collateral C(t) obviously reduces the collateral gap that must
be financed, so the Credit and Debit Constraints become∑
i
ωCi B
C
i (t) = (Vt − C(t))+ (21)
and ∑
i
ωBi B
B
i (t) = − (Vt − C(t))− . (22)
It is therefore not surprising that (and as can be shown performing a more rigorous anal-
ysis), the modified Credit- and Debit Funding Valuation Adjustments will be
CFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s) γ
C
s (Vt − C(t))+ ds
]
(23)
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and
DFV At = E
[∫ T
t
1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s) γ
B
s (Vt − C(t))− ds
]
, (24)
In these equations it is implicitly contained that the collateral itself can generate expo-
sure to the counterparty. For example, if C(t) is negative, due to some large Independent
Amount of collateral, while Vt ≈ 0, the positive exposure will then be
(Vt − C(t))+ ≈ |C(t)| .
The second effect that must be taken into account is that of the cure period ∆. If
the period is sufficiently short, in the sense that the potential variation in the derivatives
value over the period is small compared to the exposures (Vt − C(t))±, this effect can be
ignored. And in general, we would typically ignore it in the funding terms, since they are
given as integrals over time, and the additional funding required during the cure period
is therefore relatively small. However, for a sufficiently well-collateralized deal it may
become the main contribution to the value of CVA and DVA. In order to incorporate it,
we set13
CV At = E
[
1{τC<τB}D(t, τ
C)
(
1−RC(τC)) (V cτC+∆ − C(τC))+] (25)
with the understanding that if τC + ∆ > T we redefine V c
τC+∆
as V cT . The rationale is
simply that we take the default time to be the moment in which collateral is no longer
posted, while we are still exposed to the counterparty during the cure period.
In practice, it can be difficult to solve the partially collateralized pricing equation
exactly. Consider for example taking into consideration Minimum Transfer Amounts in
the collateral function C(t). This will introduce a path-dependent derivatives price, which
is difficult to combine with the recursive nature of the pricing equation (recall that equation
(19) is recursive since Vt will depend on future values Vs, with s ≥ t through the funding
terms), which is simplest to treat if the equation can be solved from maturity backwards
to the present.
For the uncollateralized case we mentioned the use of bond curves in the calculation
of CVA and DVA as an approximation to the full CFVA and DFVA calculations. Some
care must be taken when extending this approach to the partially collateralized case,
however. The issue is that the cure period ∆ enters into the CVA term but not CFVA.
Calculating a bond-based CVA would thus imply financing an exposure that only appears
at default during the entire derivative lifetime. The solution is to split the exposure
underlying CVA into two pieces, one which is an exposure during life, and one which is
an incremental Exposure At Default (which would contain effects stemming from the cure
period), defined as the difference between the exposure entering (25) and that of (23).
We can then calculate two CVA terms, one based on the exposure during life and the full
bond curve, and one based on the incremental EAD and credit spreads. The symmetric
treatment should of course be given to DVA.
13This ignores the discount factor between τC and τC+∆, which for practical purposes can be neglected.
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5 Conclusions and Discussion
The aim of this paper has been to define a fair value for a financial derivatives transaction,
entered into by a bank and its counterparty, completely consistent with all available market
information, including bond prices. After summarizing the steps taken, we will discuss
how the approach is
• Compatible with the notion of exit price, underlying IFRS 13.
• Consistent with market bond prices.
• Not entity specific.
• Not based on future costs. We will explain why cost-based derivative valuations are
not desirable from an accounting point of view.
• Free of double-counting between CVA and funding costs.
In summary, taking the well-defined case of a perfectly collateralized derivative as a
point of departure, we obtain the uncollateralized and partially collateralized cases by
modeling the financing of the lack or excess of collateral with respect to this case. For
example, if the counterparty should have posted more collateral in the perfectly collater-
alized case, we recognize that we are lending the missing collateral to the counterparty,
which implicitly means that we are holding bonds issued by the counterparty for the same
amount. Modeling the bonds in a way consistent with the derivative’s dependence on the
bond curve, and its behavior in default, provides the pricing equation (19), containing the
perfectly collateralized value, contingent CVA and DVA and a Bilateral Funding Valua-
tion Adjustment. The funding terms consist of a Credit Funding Valuation Adjustment,
depending on the counterparty’s bond-CDS basis, and a Debit Funding Valuation Adjust-
ment, governed by the bank’s bond-CDS basis. Altogether we obtain a symmetric pricing
formula implying that both parties will obtain the same valuation, which we have shown
to be consistent with bond prices. Due to its recursive nature, the pricing formula
may prove difficult to implement, but can be approximated by for instance incorporat-
ing the calculation of the FVA terms into CVA and DVA based on bond-implied default
probabilities.
From the management point of view it might not be desirable for a deep in-the-money
derivative to behave like one of the counterparty’s bonds, since the cost of funding of col-
lateral depends on the bank’s funding spread. However, the counterparty bond component
of the derivative can in principle be hedged by taking a short position in the same bonds.
It is true that selling bonds short often entails additional costs, but this is not always so
if existing long positions can be reduced, and in any case it does not seem defensible to
include such costs in accounting fair value. The present proposal may present challenges
if applied to derivatives management, since the bond-CDS bases are frequently difficult
to estimate, introduce additional volatility in the fair value, and can become negative,
18
producing counterintuitive results such as negative CFVA. However, if such issues are
considered problematic, a different framework can be used for determining management
P&L and other performance metrics14.
Our ultimate goal is to be compliant with IFRS 13, which defines fair value as a non-
entity-specific, market based, exit price. In turn, exit price is defined as the price obtained
or paid when transferring an asset or liability, respectively, with an emphasis on the
valuations performed by other market participants. The problem is that, strictly speaking,
a derivative cannot be transferred. Its very nature depends on the two counterparties
involved, and a transferred derivative is no longer the same derivative, exhibiting a different
distribution of cash flows (since defaults alter the cash flow structure). Also, the bank
can not freely transfer its side of the derivative to a different market participant. Instead
the counterparty must agree to cancel the deal, and enter a new one with the market
participant.
One solution then is to define exit price as the counterparty’s replacement cost, shifting
the issue of transfer to the counterparty. For an asymmetric derivative price, such as what
is obtained with many approaches to FVA, this becomes awkward, resulting in an exit
price depending on the counterparty’s funding spread, but not the bank’s, unless it is
assumed that the third party involved (which takes over the bank’s side of the derivative)
has an identical funding spread as the bank. A symmetric formulation, such as the one
defined here, does not have this problem, since price agreement is, in principal, always
possible.
Furthermore, our formulation is not entity-specific. It is true that the proposed fair
value depends on the bank’s bond-CDS basis, but this is fundamentally not different from
the dependence of DVA on its credit spreads. What we are doing is simply extending the
credit component already present in DVA to encompass the full bond price, which is fixed
by the market. What IFRS 13 actually means by a non-entity-specific valuation is that the
exit price should not depend on such factors as the intention to hold the deal to maturity,
etc. Another way of looking at this issue is to recognize that we are decomposing a given
trade into a perfectly collateralized one, some bonds, and possibly CDS, all of which have
well defined market values, determined by market participants independent of the entity.
A similar FVA term compliant with the existing accounting framework has also been
obtained in [18], where a bilateral funding valuation adjustment is achieved, also depend-
ing on the bond-CDS bases of both counterparties. The point of departure, however, is
rather different from the one shown here. While in this paper the value of an uncollater-
alized derivative has been decomposed into a perfectly collateralized portfolio plus bonds
issued by both participants, finally leading to terms 16 and 17, in [18] it is argued that
counterparties agreeing on a derivative transaction should be indifferent between enter-
ing its uncollateralized version or the collateralized equivalent with the collateral account
14In our view, a CVA desk should only be affected by risks that it is expected to manage. If it suffers
from, for example, DVA volatility, it will have incentives to hedge DVA, while such hedging might not be
desirable from a global balance sheet perspective: it introduces additional costs and risks with no clear
associated benefit, while an unhedged DVA acts as a natural hedge for global earnings volatility.
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accruing at the financing rates of the corresponding participant to whom the derivative
represents a liability. Such an assumption leads to non-recursive versions of CFVA and
DFVA, that can be regarded as first-order approximations to the ones obtained here.
Still, it is interesting that a result similar in spirit to ours follows from rather different
assumptions.
It might seem confusing that so many alternative formulations for FVA exist. We
have explained the shortcomings of alternate approaches, each one derived under varying
assumptions. For instance, if we compare the approach taken here, with the analysis
we performed in [25], in the latter a deficit of collateral was funded by the bank itself,
introducing a dependence on the bank’s own bond-CDS spread for provided liquidity, while
in this paper we recognize that such liquidity has a well-defined market value expressed
in terms of the counterparty’s bonds.
A cost-based point of view underlies most approaches to FVA. It is argued that if fu-
ture costs associated to a given derivatives transaction are not included in the valuation,
the derivative will almost certainly lead to a loss over time. There are two problems with
this statement. Firstly, the costs may not have been correctly estimated, such as is the
case with approaches where a full FVA, based on the bank’s full funding spread, is added
to the CVA15. Secondly, such an approach will behave in unpredictable ways when deals
are terminated early. A counterparty should be charged upfront for any future estimated
costs, by increasing the gross margin to anticipate them, but it would be paradoxical to
charge the counterparty even more when closing out the deal, citing variations in expected
future costs.
To illustrate why this could happen let us consider, tongue-in-cheek, that besides
an FVA, a manager with foresight decides to include an EVA, an Electricity Valuation
Adjustment, in his derivative pricing. The operation of the derivatives desk will contribute
to the electricity consumption of the bank, introducing a dependence on the electric spot
price, he argues. Fortunately it can be hedged by entering into an electricity swap, and
the cost of hedging can easily be included in the valuation. Counterparties start paying
upfront in accordance with this new pricing, and time passes. Some time later, electricity
prices suddenly plummet, but due to the hedges there is no impact in P& L, and all is
well. Until one day, when one of the largest counterparties asks to undo a large position
with the bank.
-’Alright’, the bank manager says, ’but you will have to compensate me for the variation
in my future electricity costs.’
-’What? Electricity prices have fallen! And why should I have to compensate you for costs
that you will not end up incurring, once the transaction has been closed?’
-’I have hedged my electricity exposure, so closing out my hedges will imply an additional
cost.’
15As explained in Section 2.4, this does not take into consideration the overlap between CVA and
the bank’s funding costs. Trading with counterparties with a better credit quality than the bank itself
will produce a funding benefit over time, and in the case of a balance sheet in equilibrium (with new deals
replacing similar old deals on a continuous basis) this funding benefit is already incorporated into the
current funding spread.
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The bank manager continued insisting, and the counterparty had to accept the proposed
close-out, but was naturally not pleased.
Next day, upper management came to see the manager.
-’We’re afraid you’re going to have to liquidate the portfolio we have with XYZ-bank.
Capital ratios are looking a bit shaky, and we’ve decided that the position has to go.’
Five minutes later, the manager had his contact at XYZ-bank on the phone.
-’Sure! We’ll terminate the position. You’ll have to pay us for the close-out of our elec-
tricity hedge, though.’, XYZ-bank said.
-’Umm, I was kind of hoping that you would pay us...’, the manager answered.
-’Now, why would we do that?’
In the end, the manager’s desk took a loss corresponding to approximately twice the cost
of closing out the EVA hedge.
The moral of this tale is that cost-based accounting only makes sense if assets and
liabilities are guaranteed to be held to maturity. IFRS 13 explicitly forbids adopting
this assumption, for good reasons. In a situation of stress a bank may be forced to
liquidate large portions of its derivatives portfolio and will not have the luxury to affect
the liquidation amounts, thereby running the risk of large losses. This would also exclude
valuation adjustments, put forth recently in the literature, such as KVA (Capital Valuation
Adjustment)[34]. An exit price should be obtained from the counterparty’s perspective,
and will only coincide with the bank’s viewpoint if, as we do, a symmetric approach is
adopted.
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A A formal derivation of the pricing formula
Let us now derive the pricing formula shown above with some analytical rigor. To do so, we
will study a derivatives transaction and its replication building upon the setup described in
[27] and [25], but with the important new ingredient being the adoption of the Credit- and
Debit Constraints (11) and (12), respectively, which enforce the consistency of derivative-
and bond valuations. The setup has the properties16:
• The derivative depends on a single underlying market factor St and has only a single
payoff at maturity date T .
• The parties involved in the transaction are separated into a Bank (B) and a Coun-
terparty (C). The sign of its value is as seen by the bank.
• Credit spreads are allowed to be stochastic.
• The portfolio should be self-financing, with no additional funding obtained.
• We assume a riskless close-out in the event that either bank or counterparty defaults,
implying that claims put forth by either the surviving party or the liquidators of
the defaulted party will be based upon the MtM of the corresponding perfectly
collateralized transaction. No further defaults are thus considered when determining
the close-out amounts.
• Risk factors are, for simplicity, taken to be driven by single factor models, such as a
single credit spread factor, and interest rates are deterministic.
In this setup, the bank will construct a replicating portfolio in a similar fashion as in [27]
and [25]. We will skip some steps in the derivation of the strategy. The interested reader is
referred to these works for more detail. We must note that the approach followed here will
be that of replication, which is not necessarily the same thing as hedging. Although the
difference between both concepts may appear subtle, it does plays a role in this context.
Let us comment a bit on this before continuing with the derivation.
We use the term ’replication’ in the sense of decomposition, so that the price of a given
deal is simply equated to the price of a portfolio of simpler instruments (the replicating
portfolio) which in aggregate produce the same cashflows and sensitivities to market vari-
ables as the original deal. By contrast, pricing by hedging would entail assigning a value
to a given derivative based on the hedging transactions that the corresponding bank or
financial institution is able (or willing) to perform. The rationale behind this approach
states that a bank who intends to produce and sell a derivative will hedge its position in
the market. The price to be charged to the customer, that could be regarded as the value
of the transaction, would be that of the hedging portfolio.
16These conditions can be easily relaxed, which would, with the exeption of the close-out assumptions,
not affect the final result.
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The limitation of the pricing-by-hedging viewpoint is that it cannot account for un-
hedgeable risks. As an example, a long position in a liquid bond has a well defined market
price, but it is impossible to reproduce through hedging. The reason is that a hedge would
entail shorting the bond, which would first have to be obtained via a repo transaction, with
the ensuing reception of a repo-rate, leading to the bond yield not being fully recovered
(apart from the fact that the cash lent in the repo would have to be funded, introducing a
dependency on the hedger’s funding spread). In the same way, when pricing derivatives by
hedging, the bond-like characteristics of the derivative are simply discarded. Thus, we will
define the replicating portfolio in terms of instruments with well-defined market value and
exit-price, but which may, due to the presence of bonds, not be directly interpretable as
a hedging portfolio. Finally, accounting considerations make it difficult to defend hedging
approaches17.
The replicating portfolio will consist of a collateralized derivative Ht, used for capturing
market risk, bonds issued by both the counterparty and the bank, a short-term CDS18
written on the Counterparty, CDSC(t, t + dt), for eliminating counterparty’s jump-to-
default risk, plus another short-term CDS written on the Bank, CDSB(t, t + dt), for
eliminating bank’s jump-to-default risk19.
Moreover, since credit spreads are taken to be stochastic, the bank will also need to
eliminate these sources of risk. To do so, it will trade in bonds issued by the counterparty
and itself, taking care that the portfolio remains self-financing, which can achieved in the
following way:
• To replicate its own credit spread risk, the bank will be trading in bonds of its
own of different maturities satisfying the debit constraint (12). Since here we will
only be concerned with a single-factor model, just two bonds will be sufficient. For
simplicity, we will take one of them, BB(t, t+dt), to be infinitesimally short-termed,
while the other, BB(t, T ), is of finite maturity. In this case, the debit constraint
takes the form
17As an example, IFRS 13 states that the fair value of a liability must reflect non-performance risk,
that is, ”the risk that the entity will not fulfill an obligation”. Such a statement gives rise to the usual
DVA term in annual reports of financial institutions. However, DVA is difficult to motivate in terms of
hedging since no institution is able to completely hedge its own credit risk, including the jump-to-default
component. But this component does exist and, as shown in [25], has a well-defined value even for the
institution considered as a going concern. Furthermore, IFRS 13 emphasizes that fair value must be a
market-based measurement, and ”not an entity-specific measurement”, ie, the value of a derivative should
not depend on internal decisions taken by the entity, such as the intention to hold the asset, to settle or
to partially or totally hedge it.
18The short-term (infinitesimal) CDSs are a theoretical construct (see [27] for more details) used here
for simplicity, but in practice, the same hedging can be carried out by trading in two contracts of finite,
but different, maturity.
19Although the bank does not have free access to its own CDS, as shown in [25], this instrument has a
well-defined value for it and lies implicitly in the derivative. Therefore, by including it in the replication
portfolio, we are simply expliciting an existing component of the payoff. Alternatively, as in [24], two
bonds of different seniority could have been used.
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− V −t = −max{−Vt, 0} = ΩBt BB(t, t+ dt) + ωBt BB(t, T ) , (26)
where ΩBt and ω
B
t are the quantities held of each bond. The bank could hedge this
component by buying back its own debt of an amount precisely equal to −V −t .
• To eliminate the counterparty’s credit spread risk, the bank will trade in bonds
issued by the counterparty satisfying the credit constraint (11). As before, we will
use just two bonds, BC(t, t+ dt) and BC(t, T ). The credit constraint becomes:
V +t = max{Vt, 0} = ΩCt BC(t, t+ dt) + ωCt BC(t, T ) , (27)
with ΩCt and ω
C
t defined analogously as Ω
B
t and ω
B
t .
Finally, we will have some cash in a collateral account, described using a unit-of-
account Ct, of constant value 1, which generates an annualized interest of ct, given by
precisely the rate paid on collateral.
Putting all pieces together, the replicating portfolio will be
Vt = αtHt + βtCt + tCDS
C(t, t+ dt) + ηtCDS
B(t, t+ dt)
+ΩCt B
C(t, t+ dt) + ωCt B
C(t, T ) + ΩBt B
B(t, t+ dt) + ωBt B
B(t, T ) ,
(28)
where the Greek letters represent the amounts held of each instrument in the portfolio.
We assume that the evolution of the relevant market variables under the real measure
P is described as

dSt = µ
S
t Stdt+ σ
S
t dW
S,P
t
dpiCt = µ
C
t dt+ σ
C
t dW
C,P
t
dpiBt = µ
B
t dt+ σ
B
t dW
B,P
t
(29)
where St represents the price of the derivative’s underlying asset at time t, while pi
C
t and
piBt are the short term CDS spread of the counterparty and bank, respectively. These
spreads are defined so that CDSk(t, t + dt) = 0, k ∈ {C,B}. µSt , µCt and µBt are the real
world drifts of these processes, while σSt (t, St), σ
C
t (t, pi
C
t ), σ
B
t (t, pi
B
t ) are their volatilities.
Interest rates will be taken to be deterministic.
The three processes will be correlated with time dependent correlations:
ρS,Ct dt = dW
S,P
t dW
C,P
t ρ
B,C
t dt = dW
B,P
t dW
C,P
t ρ
S,B
t dt = dW
S,P
t dW
B,P
t (30)
Two additional sources of uncertainty are described by the default indicator processes
NC,Pt = 1{τC≤t} and N
B,P
t = 1{τB≤t}, with real world intensities λ
C,P
t and λ
B,P
t , with τ
C
and τB being the default times of the counterparty and the bank, respectively.
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To do the replication, we will proceed in the standard way, equating the differential
of (28), assuming a self-financing strategy, with the expression obtained by expanding
dVt using Itoˆ’s Lemma, and choosing the available coefficients so that the stochastic terms
cancel. The remaining, deterministic terms then imply a differential equation for Vt. Since
this procedure is fairly standard, for the sake of brevity, we will omit some steps, and not
spell out explicitly certain terms.
Conditional on both the counterparty and the bank being alive at time t, the change
in Vt will be given by (applying Itoˆ’s Lemma for jump diffusion processes)
dVt = LSCBVtdt+ ∂Vt∂StStσSt dW
S,P
t +
∂Vt
∂piCt
σCt dW
C,P
t +
∂Vt
∂piBt
σBt dW
B,P
t
+∆V Ct dN
C,P
t + ∆V
B
t dN
B,P
t ,
(31)
where LSCBVt groups together deterministic terms.
On the other hand, by assuming a self-replicating trading strategy, taking the differ-
ential of (28) gives
dVt = αtdHt + βtdCt + tdCDS
C(t, t+ dt) + ηtdCDS
B(t, t+ dt)
+ΩCt dB
C(t, t+ dt) + ωCt dB
C(t, T ) + ΩBt dB
B(t, t+ dt) + ωBt dB
B(t, T )
(32)
We write down the differentials of the short- and long term bonds, including terms
corresponding to their jump-to-default, as well as the instantaneous CDS and the collateral
account20:

dBk(t, t+ dt) = fkt B
k(t, t+ dt)dt+ (Rk − 1)Bk(t, t+ dt)dNk,Pt
dBk(t, T ) = LkBk(t, T )dt+ ∂B
k(t,T )
∂pikt
σkt dW
k,P
t + ∆B
k(t, T )dNk,Pt
dCDSk(t, t+ dt) = pikt dt− (1−Rk)dNk,Pt
dCt = ctdt
(33)
for k ∈ {C,B}, where fkt = ct + f¯kt represents the short term funding rate, f¯kt is the short
term funding spread over the OIS rate ct, Rk is the recovery rate upon default, and
LkBk(t, T ) = ∂B
k(t,T )
∂t + µ
k
t
∂Bk(t,T )
∂pikt
+ 12(σ
k
t )
2 ∂
2Bk(t,T )
∂2pikt
If we substitute all the differential terms in (32), we reach a replicating equation in
which we eliminate the stochastic terms driven by dW k,Pt , k ∈ {C,B, S} and dNC,Pt , dNB,Pt
by taking
20Actually, as explained in [35], this formulation of the self-financing condition is an abuse of notation.
For example, we have stated that Ct is a unit-of-account of constant value 1, and should therefore obey
dCt = 0. However, it should be understood implicitly, when reading (32), that the differentials of the
different components refer to the gain processes, including generated dividends.
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αt =
∂Vt
∂St
∂Ht
∂St
ωCt =
∂Vt
∂piCt
∂BC (t,T )
∂piCt
ωBt =
∂Vt
∂piBt
∂BB(t,T )
∂piBt
t = −V +t − ∆V
C
t
1−RC
ηt = V
−
t − ∆V
B
t
1−RB
(34)
while Ωkt , k ∈ {C,B}, are fixed by the constraints (26) and (27).
Making use of the PDEs for Ht, B
C(t, T ) and BB(t, T ), we obtain the final PDE:
LˆSCBVt + pi
C
t
1−RC ∆V
C
t +
piBt
1−RB∆V
B
t = (f
C
t − piCt )V +t − (fBt − piBt )V −t , (35)
where
LˆSCBVt = ∂Vt∂t + (rt − qt)St ∂Vt∂St + (µBt −MBt σBt ) ∂Vt∂piBt + (µ
C
t −MCt σCt ) ∂Vt∂piCt
+12
∂2Vt
∂S2t
S2t (σ
S
t )
2 + 12
∂2Vt
∂piB
2
t
(σBt )
2 + 12
∂2Vt
∂piC
2
t
(σCt )
2
+ ∂
2Vt
∂St∂piBt
Stσ
S
t σ
B
t ρ
S,B
t +
∂2Vt
∂St∂piCt
Stσ
S
t σ
C
t ρ
S,C
t +
∂2Vt
∂piCt ∂pi
B
t
σCt σ
B
t ρ
C,B
t ,
MCt and M
B
t are the market price of credit risk of the counterparty and bank, respectively,
that is, the expected excess return of a credit derivative on each of them over the collateral
rate divided by the derivatives’ volatility.
Once we have arrived to the PDE depicted in (35), we can follow the well-known steps
leading to the Feynman-Kac formula (shown in, for example, [36]). To do so, we define
the process:
Xt = Vt exp
(
−
∫ t
s=0
cs ds
)
1{τC>t}1{τB>t} (36)
We then place ourselves in the risk-neutral measure Q in which the drifts of St, piBt
and piCt are given by (rt− qt)St, µBt −MBt σBt and µCt −MCt σCt , respectively. Furthermore,
default intensities of the counterparty and bank are given by:
λC,Qt =
piCt
1−RC λ
B,Q
t =
piBt
1−RB
We apply Itoˆ’s Lemma for jump diffusion processes to Xt in Q, using the stochastic
discount factor notation already introduced in (9)
dXt = D(0, t)
[
1{τC>t}1{τB>t}
(
− ctVtdt+ LˆSCBVtdt+ ∂Vt∂StStσSt dWSt
+ ∂Vt
∂piCt
σCt dW
C
t +
∂Vt
∂piBt
σBt dW
B
t
)
− 1{τC>t}VtdNB,Qt − 1{τB>t}VtdNC,Qt
]
,
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while from the PDE shown above, we have:
LˆSCBVt = (fCt − piCt )V +t − (fBt − piBt )V −t − λC,Qt ∆V Ct − λB,Qt ∆V Bt
= (ct + f¯
C
t − piCt )V +t − (ct + f¯Bt − piBt )V −t − λC,Qt ∆V Ct − λB,Qt ∆V Bt
= ctVt + (f¯
C
t − piCt )V +t − (f¯Bt − piBt )V −t − λC,Qt ∆V Ct − λB,Qt ∆V Bt
so that, naming γkt = f¯
k
t − pikt , k ∈ {C,B}, we get
dXt = D(0, t)
[
1{τC>t}1{τB>t}
(
(f¯Ct − piCt )V +t dt− (f¯Bt − piBt )V −t dt
−λC,Qt ∆V Ct dt− λB,Qt ∆V Bt dt+ ∂Vt∂StStσSt dWSt
+ ∂Vt
∂piCt
σCt dW
C
t +
∂Vt
∂piBt
σBt dW
B
t
)
− 1{τC>t}VtdNB,Qt − 1{τB>t}VtdNC,Qt
]
,
Next, we can integrate between t and T and take expectations conditional on Ft. Terms
in dW disappear since they are expected values of Itoˆ integrals. Furthermore, terms in λ
also vanish due to the definition of default intensity, allowing us to write:
Vt = EQ
[
VTD(t, T )1{τC>T}1{τB>T}|Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τB>s}D(t, s)(Vs + ∆V
C
s )dN
C,Q
s |Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}D(t, s)(Vs + ∆V
B
s )dN
B,Q
s |Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
C
s V
+
s ds|Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
B
s V
−
s ds|Ft
]
(37)
We let V ct be the time t value that the derivative would have if it were perfectly
collateralized. Now, if we assume, in accordance with a riskless close-out, that after the
counterparty’s default, Vs jumps to RCV
c
s if V
c
s ≥ 0 and to V cs if V cs < 0, and that after
the bank’s default Vs jumps to V
c
s if V
c
s ≥ 0 and to RBV cs if V cs < 0, then, after some
indicator manipulations (see, for example, Appendix A of [25] for details), we arrive at
Vt = EQ
[
VTD(t, T )|Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t
∫ +∞
u=s D(t, s)(1−RC)(V cs )+dNB,Qu dNC,Qs |Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t
∫ +∞
u=s D(t, s)(1−RB)(V cs )−dNC,Qu dNB,Qs |Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
C
s V
+
s ds|Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
B
s V
−
s ds|Ft
]
(38)
Intermediate cash flows can easily be incorporated by substituting the first term on
the RHS of (38) for the complete perfectly collateralized price V ct , which discounts all cash
flows to present time using OIS rate ct.
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B Practical approximations
The obtained pricing equation (38) may be difficult to evaluate directly, due to its recursive
nature. For this reason we will now provide a couple of approximations that can be used in
practice. We begin by suggesting the omission of the recursivity in the CFVA and DFVA
terms, providing a straightforward option. We then proceed to study whether it would be
valid to drop both FVA terms and instead calculate contingent debit and credit valuation
adjustments based on the default probabilities extracted from bonds issued by the bank
and its counterparty, respectively, and thereby incorporate funding considerations via the
CVA and DVA terms. As we will see, the resulting expression equals the pricing equation
to a first-order approximation.
Let us first rewrite (38) using the definition of default intensity.
Vt = EQ
[
VTD(t, T )|Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t λ
C
s 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)(1−RC)(V cs )+ds|Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t λ
B
s 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)(1−RB)(V cs )−ds|Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
C
s V
+
s ds|Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
B
s V
−
s ds|Ft
]
(39)
If we iterate the integral equation, the future derivative exposures V ±s entering into the
FVA terms become (V cs − CV As +DV As − CFV As +DFV As)±. Since the FVA terms
will be O(γ2), they can be dropped in a first-order approximation in the bond-CDS bases
(which tend to be small). Also, in most cases CV As and DV As will be small compared
to V cs , and we can drop their feedback into the FVA terms as well. The upshot is that in
the FVA terms the full exposure Vs can be approximated by its collateralized equivalent
V cs . Recalling that pi
k
s = λ
k
s(1−Rk), k ∈ {B,C} we therefore get
Vt = EQ
[
VTD(t, T )|Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)(pi
C
s + γ
C
s )(V
c
s )
+ds|Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)(pi
B
s + γ
B
s )(V
c
s )
−ds|Ft
] (40)
We recall that piks +γ
k
s = f¯
k
s is the short term funding spread over the OIS rate ct. This
equation is much simpler to evaluate than (39), and in fact the second and third terms
are structurally equivalent to the Funding Cost Adjustment (FCA) and Funding Benefit
Adjustment (FBA) found in, for example, [6]. The difference is that in [6] the FCA term
is governed by the bank’s, and not the counterparty’s, funding spread, and the overlap
with CVA is also not corrected for. Here, a separate term for CVA is not obtained since
it is fully contained in the FCA term. Keeping CVA and DVA separate, we thus have the
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approximate expressions
CFV At = EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t
1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
C
s (V
c
s )
+ds|Ft
]
, (41)
and
DFV At = EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t
1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)γ
B
s (V
c
s )
−ds|Ft
]
. (42)
Now, returning to equation (40): if we bootstrapped default probabilities from a bond,
the funding spread f¯kt can be approximated as the instantaneous default probability ex-
tracted from the bond, λ¯kt , times the loss-given-default
21. Thus, the resulting equation
is:
Vt = EQ
[
VTD(t, T )|Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)λ¯
C
s (1−RC)(V cs )+ds|Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}1{τB>s}D(t, s)λ¯
B
s (1−RB)(V cs )−ds|Ft
] (43)
Finally, the distributions of the default indicator functions 1{τk>s} depend on the de-
fault probabilities λks = λ¯
k
s−γks /(1−Rk) = λ¯ks +O(γk). Thus, at first-order approximation
in γk, and back to the notation of (38), we obtain the following expression:
Vt = EQ
[
VTD(t, T )|Ft
]
−EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t
∫ +∞
u=s D(t, s)(1−RC)(V cs )+dN¯B,Qu dN¯C,Qs |Ft
]
+EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t
∫ +∞
u=s D(t, s)(1−RB)(V cs )−dN¯C,Qu dN¯B,Qs |Ft
] (44)
where the dN¯k,Qs are default processes inferred from the bond curves. We have thus also
shown that the CFVA and DFVA terms can be absorbed, to first order, into the CVA and
DVA adjustments.
C Consistency with Bond Prices
We have constructed the pricing equation (19) taking into consideration bond-CDS bases
in order to be consistent with both the counterparty’s and the bank’s bonds. But can we
actually reproduce observed bond prices in the current framework? Yes, but we have to
21Imagine a one-period zero coupon bond that gave us 1 at time 1 with probability 1 − p and R with
probability p, being c the constant risk-free rate between t = 0 and t = 1. Using standard valuation
theory, the price of this bond at time 0 is B(0) = (1 − p)e−c + pRe−c = e−c(1 − (1 − R)p), which can
be approximated as B(0) = e−(c+(1−R)p). Therefore, the funding spread needed to match the price of the
bond equals its probability of default times 1−R.
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be careful when doing so. The difference between bonds and derivatives is that the latter
will be liquidated upon default of either counterparty. A bond, by contrast, is traded in
the market, and the market itself cannot in general cause the bond to be liquidated. So
the first step in reproducing bond prices is to make the bond buyer default-free, based on
the understanding that if the buyer of the bond were to default, the bond would simply
be sold in the market with no change in value22.
Assuming that the bank is the buyer (the bond is an asset), the pricing equation for
the bond would then be
Vt = V
c
t − CV At − CFV At , (45)
where there is no DVA since the bank’s default is irrelevant to the bond price, and no
DFVA since the exposure is always positive for an asset.
Equation 38 then becomes
Vt = V
c
t − EQ
[ ∫ T
s=tD(t, s)(1−RC)V cs dNC,Qs |Ft
]
− EQ
[ ∫ T
s=t 1{τC>s}D(t, s)γ
C
s Vsds|Ft
]
(46)
where positive exposures V +s have been substituted for Vs since the valuation will always
be positive.
Let us now check what this equation gives for the simple case of a default-free issuer and
a zero-coupon bond of notional N and maturity T , and under the simplified assumption
that the discount rate c, as well as the bond-CDS basis γ, are deterministic and constant.
Then there will be no CVA, the deal will always be alive, and
CFV At =
∫ T
t
D(t, s) γ Vs ds .
Using that V ct = e
−c(T−t)N The full pricing equation will therefore be
Vt = e
−c(T−t)N −
∫ T
t
e−c(s−t) γ Vs ds .
It can easily be checked that the solution to this equation is
Vt = e
−(c+γ)(T−t) ,
and so we recover the bond price corresponding to a default-free bond.
The issue gets more complicated when credit risk is involved, and solving the equation
does not directly produce a simple exponential expression for the bond price. The reason is
subtle, and related to the different recovery conventions used when modeling the defaults
of derivatives and bonds, respectively. For derivatives we are, as explained in Section 3,
assuming a riskless close-out, which means that the post-default value of a derivative is
22An exception of course is if the buyer is a systemic entity, correlated with the bond issuer. Such
systemic dependence should already be contained in the issuer’s bond curve, however, and so when pricing
we can assume that the buyer is a small, with no systemic impact
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taken as a multiple R of the riskless (or perfectly collateralized) value. By contrast, for
mathematical simplicity we have modeled, in Appendix A, the recovery of the bonds in
the replicating portfolio as relative, meaning that they denote the fraction of the full pre-
default value that is recovered after default. We can easily accommodate such a recovery
convention by performing the substitution
R→ R Vt
V ct
in equation (46). By doing so, and solving the equation, one obtains the price of the zero
coupon bond as
Vt = e
−(c+pi+γ)(T−t)N , (47)
where pi is the CDS spread (again assuming that all parameters are constant in time).
The notional amount is therefore simply discounted by the bond curve.
Yet a third approach is the common standard consisting of defining the recovery frac-
tion as the proportion of the notional amount that is recovered. In general, holding all
other parameters constant, different bond prices will be obtained for different recovery con-
ventions. Market prices are unique, though, which implies that bond-CDS bases directly
obtained from bond curves will differ depending on the recovery convention adopted, in
such a way as to compensate for the differences. The bond-CDS basis we use, is that of a
relative recovery convention, so if such a convention is adopted, the bond-CDS basis can
easily be obtained by inferring the bond curve used to discount bond cash flows. Other
recovery conventions are not on the same footing as the relative one, but the difference in
bond-CDS bases should not be large.
In order to be able to obtain greater precision, we will derive expressions for bond prices
from (46), which can be used to calibrate the bond-CDS basis parameters γXt , X ∈ {C,B}
to market prices. An alternative is of course to use observed bond-CDS bases directly,
but it should be born in mind that strictly speaking the bases introduced in Appendix A
correspond to bonds using a relative recovery convention. In Section C.1 we derive the
value for a bond under a riskless recovery assumption (the default value of the bond is the
recovery fraction times the bond valuation obtained by discounting using the OIS curve),
while we obtain the price corresponding to an absolute recovery convention (in which the
default value is a constant recovery fraction of the notional) in Section C.2.
C.1 Bond with Riskless Recovery
Let us assume a bond issued by the counterparty with notional N , generating a series
of cash flows ci at payment dates Ic = {tPi }. As stated above, the bond’s holder can be
assumed not to affect its price, so we can suppose that the bank cannot default, that is,
λB = 0, so we will only care for those variables related to the counterparty (the bank’s
bond-CDS basis is also irrelevant since V −t = 0). For simplicity, we will assume that recov-
eries and interest rates (and therefore, discount factors) are deterministic. Furthermore,
hazard rates λj and bond-CDS basis γk are deterministic and display a piecewise-constant
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structure, with parameters remaining constant between dates {tλj } and {tγk}, respectively.
Let us define {tA} = {tPi } ∪ {tλj } ∪ {tγk}.
Let us first consider the case in which we only have one period: [t0, t1]. The bond only
pays at date t1 a cash flow equal to c1 (which includes the notional). With this in mind,
substituting in (46) for t ∈ [t0, t1] yields:
Vt = D(t, t1)c1 − γ1
∫ t1
s=t e
−λ1(s−t)D(t, s)Vsds
− ∫ t1s=t λ1(1−R)D(s, t1)c1e−λ1(s−t)D(t, s)ds (48)
where we have used that (V cs )
+ = D(s, t1)c1. If we rewrite the expression, evaluate the
latter integral and multiply everything by D−1(t, t1)/c1, we get:
D−1(t, t1)Vtc1 = 1− γ1
∫ t1
s=t e
−λ1(s−t)D−1(s, t1)Vsc1 ds− (1−R)(1− e−λ1(t1−t)) (49)
Let us define V ∗t = D−1(t, t1)
Vt
c1
. Then we have
V ∗t = 1− γ1
∫ t1
s=t e
−λ1(s−t)V ∗s ds− (1−R)(1− e−λ1(t1−t)) (50)
Performing a change of variables by defining t˜ = λ1(t1− t) and s˜ = λ1(t1−s), together
with the notation V˜t˜ = V
∗
t , we get
V˜t˜ = 1− γ1λ1 e−t˜
∫ t˜
s˜=0 e
s˜V˜s˜ds− (1−R)(1− e−t˜) (51)
If we now multiply all terms by et˜ and differentiate with respect to t˜, we have trans-
formed the integral equation into the ordinary differential equation
V˜
′
t˜
+
(
1 + γ1λ1
)
V˜t˜ = R (52)
Solving this equation and undoing previous changes of variables, we find:
D−1(t, t1)Vtc1 =
Rλ1
λ1+γ1
+ K¯e−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t) (53)
where K¯ is an integration constant. Imposing the terminal condition Vt1 = c1, gives
Vt = c1D(t, t1)
[
1− (1−R)λ1+γ1λ1+γ1
(
1− e−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t)
)]
(54)
Next we consider the case with two periods: [t0, t1] and [t1, t2], with cash flows c1 at
t1 and c2 at t2. First, we can restrict ourselves to the period [t1, t2]. There, we can apply
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the solution (54). If we name Vt+1
as the value of the bond at date t+1 , that is, immediately
after cash flow c1 at t1 is paid, we have:
Vt+1
= c2D(t1, t2)
[
1− (1−R)λ2+γ2λ2+γ2
(
1− e−(λ2+γ2)(t2−t1)
)]
(55)
Furthermore, we can also define Vt−1
as the value of the bond at date t−1 , immediately
before cash flow c1 at t1 is paid, so:
Vt−1
= c1 + Vt+1
≡ A1 (56)
Finally, we also consider the value of the collateralized equivalent transaction at date
t−1 , defined as
V c
t−1
= c1 + c2D(t1, t2) ≡ B1 (57)
When we consider t ∈ [t0, t1] and substitute V ct1 for B1 in (46), the equation we obtain
is very similar to the one that we saw in the single-period example. The same arguments
outlined above lead us to the following expression:
D−1(t, t1) VtB1 =
Rλ1
λ1+γ1
+ K¯e−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t) (58)
We then apply the terminal condition Vt1 = A1 to determine K¯. Putting all pieces
together, we arrive at the final expression:
Vt = c1D(t, t1)
[
1− (1−R)λ1+γ1λ1+γ1
(
1− e−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t)
)]
+c2D(t, t2)
[
1− (1−R)λ1+γ1λ1+γ1
(
1− e−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t)
)
− (1−R)λ2+γ2λ2+γ2
(
1− e−(λ2+γ2)(t2−t)
)
e−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t)
] (59)
By applying sequentially the corresponding terminal conditions, we arrive to the ex-
pression for an arbitrary number of periods:
Vt =
∑
p∈Ic D(t, tp)cp
[
1−∑ni=1 (1−R)λi+γiλi+γi (1− e−(λi+γi)(ti−ti−1))×∏i−1j=1 e−(λj+γj)(tj−tj−1)]
(60)
If we make the intervals defining the piecewise-constant functions tend to zero, λi →
λ(s) and γi → γ(s), and we have the alternative expression valid for any deterministic
functions:
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Vt =
∑
p∈Ic D(t, tp)cp
[
1− ∫ tpt ((1−R)λ(s) + γ(s)) exp(− ∫ st (λ(u) + γ(u))du)ds]
(61)
If we define the liquidity-adjusted survival probability
PL(t, s) ≡ exp
(
− ∫ st (λ(u) + γ(u))du), (62)
the equation simply becomes
Vt =
∑
p∈Ic D(t, tp)cp
[
1− ∫ tpt ((1−R)λ(s) + γ(s))PL(t, s) ds] (63)
C.2 Bond with Absolute Recovery
In the case of a bond with absolute recovery, the payoff upon default is not a recov-
ery fraction of the collateralized equivalent of the bond, but recovery times the notional
amount.
We place ourselves in the same framework as in C.1. However, besides being determin-
istic, we now will assume that interest rates rj also display a piecewise-constant structure,
with parameters remaining constant between dates {trj}. Again, we first consider the case
in which we only have one period: [t0, t1]. The situation is the same as in (48), where,
using the new recovery convention, we substitute R→ R NV ct . This yields:
Vt = D(t, t1)c1 − γ1
∫ t1
s=t e
−λ1(s−t)D(t, s)Vsds
− ∫ t1s=t λ1(D(s, t1)c1 −RN)e−λ1(s−t)D(t, s)ds (64)
Proceeding as in C.1 and imposing the terminal condition Vt1 = c1, it needs to be
Vt = c1D(t, t1)e
−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t) + λ1RNr1+λ1+γ1
(
1−D(t, t1)e−(λ1+γ1)(t1−t)
)
(65)
In general, for an arbitrary number of periods, the expression would be
Vt =
∑
p∈Ic cpD(t, tp) exp
(∑p
i=1−(λi + γi)(ti − ti−1)
)
+
RN
∑p
i=1
λi
ri+λi+γi
(
1−D(ti−1, ti)e−(λi+γi)(ti−ti−1)
)∏i−1
k=1D(tk−1, tk)e
−(λk+γk)(tk−tk−1)
(66)
Again, we make the intervals defining the piecewise-constant functions tend to zero,
ri → r(s), λi → λ(s) and γi → (s), and, making use of the definition (62), we have the
alternative expression:
34
Vt =
∑
p∈Ic
[
cpD(t, tp)P
L(t, tp) +RN
∫ tp
t λ(s)D(t, s)P
L(t, s) ds
]
. (67)
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